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ROSE-COLORED GLASSES, OPAQUE
FINANCIAL REPORTING, AND INVESTOR
BLUES: ENRON AS CON AND THE
VULNERABILITY OF CANADIAN
CORPORATE LAW
JANIS SARRAt
INTRODUCTION
Enron's collapse, due to opaque financial reporting, self-
dealing transactions, failed director oversight, and auditor
conflicts of interest,' raises the issue of whether an Enron-type
failure could happen in Canada. At the time of its collapse in
December 2001, Enron Corporation was listed as the seventh
largest company in the United States, with over $100 billion in
gross revenues and more than 20,000 employees worldwide.2
Since then, shareholders have lost more than $60 billion in
market value,3 thousands of employees have lost their jobs, and
creditors have lost billions in trade and other credit. This Article
suggests that while there is an element of "Enron as con,"
Enron's collapse is also attributable to more systemic problems
in both corporate law and securities regulation. Enron is
extraordinary not only for its systems failure but also for the
breadth and depth of harm inflicted on investors, workers, and
creditors. Although some initially believed that Enron was an
outlier in terms of its failed governance, it was quickly followed
t Dr. Sarra teaches at the Faculty of Law University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada. My thanks to Joel Whysall and Jessica Sisk, UBC law
students, for research assistance on Enron. My thanks also to Ronald B. Davis for
providing helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
I At the time, Enron was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. WorldCom's
recent bankruptcy filing involves almost double Enron's debt, with $63 billion in
debt and 65,000 employees. See Miro Cernetis, WorldCom Largest Chapter 11 in
History, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, July 23, 2002, at Al.
2 S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 6 (2002).
3 Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron,
Financial Fraud and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1592-93 (2002).
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by the collapse of WorldCom, with 65,000 employees, and several
other publicly traded companies. These failures collectively
reveal serious systemic problems with the current corporate
governance paradigm.
Canada may be equally vulnerable, given that its corporate
regime mirrors much of the U.S. paradigm. Like their American
counterparts, Canadians are increasingly vulnerable in that
more individuals invest in the markets-frequently as a
retirement plan. Almost fifty percent of Canadian adults own
stock, which is double the number from two decades ago.4 The
effect of Enron's collapse has rippled into Canadian markets,
reducing investor confidence and raising public concern
regarding the current regulatory system's ability to protect
investors. In the past twenty-two months, there have been stock
losses of $450 billion in Canada-forty-three percent of the value
of stocks.5 In July 2002 alone, investors withdrew $1.1 billion
from mutual funds. 6
Corporate failure has a wide spread impact. It not only
affects those shareholders with equity investments at risk; but it
also results in job losses for employees, lost pension benefits,
spin-off economic harm to communities, and enormous losses for
consumers, small trade creditors, and senior creditors. While
corporate insolvency and bankruptcy often are the result of
market pressures or governance failures, few could have
predicted the magnitude of Enron's failure of governance. The
solutions currently being posed to protect Canadian investors are
important and immediate. To date, however, the discussion of
corporate law post-Enron has missed a valuable opportunity to
more fundamentally consider corporate governance and
stakeholder democracy.
This Article examines 'both the immediate implications of
Enron for Canadian corporate governance and the more systemic
issues that it raises. There are three highly interrelated aspects
to Enron's collapse: (1) a failure of effective corporate governance
and the implications for the shareholder primacy norm; (2) the
limitations of securities regulation in the protection of
shareholders and creditors; and (3) the role of auditors in
4 K Foss & C. Alphonse, Stocks, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, July 20, 2002, at A5.
5 Id.
r Dave Ebner, Investors Flee Mutual Funds, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, August
3, 2002, at B1.
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effective investor protection. These issues arise against the
backdrop of our market economy and increasing integration into
global capital markets. In this context, it is important to
remember that Anglo-American corporate governance is aimed
at the efficient allocation and use of resources to generate
surplus value and maximize return to shareholders. Thus,
corporate law and securities laws, aimed at the protection of
investors, are public laws that regulate the private ownership
regime. Corporate governance is therefore situated in a highly
codified property regime that reflects and reinforces the
historical distribution of property.
As this Article will illustrate, the attention being given to
protecting equity investors is very important to our market
economy. Equity investors are essential participants because
they provide capital at a reasonable cost-a key to generating
productive activity and promoting societal wealth. It is
important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that property
losses from corporate misconduct at Enron have given rise to
more regulatory, political, and media attention than other
equally pressing issues of corporate misconduct-such as:
serious environmental harms; occupational health harms; tort
harms from consumer products; continuing racial and gender
discrimination; and failure to comply with basic labor standards.
These are also outcomes of failed governance standards; yet in
the hierarchy of corporate misconduct, "property losses" to equity
investors are given the highest priority and the most immediate
attention. Issues such as gender and racial equality, protection
of employment and labor standards, and corporate democracy
require the same attention as investor protection.
Enron presents an important opportunity to more closely
examine the current corporate governance model in terms of the
diverse investments at risk in the corporation. While I have
explored these issues generally elsewhere,7 they are discussed
here specifically in a post-Enron context. Part I examines
"Enron as con," explaining how it was able to successfully mask
its financial status to the detriment of shareholders, employees,
and creditors.
7 See JANIS SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS (forthcoming 2002); Janis Sarra, The
Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Reform, SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
(forthcoming November 2002).
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Part II examines the Enron Board of Directors' view of
transactions through "rose-colored glasses." This part also
explores how lack of board diversity and failures in fiduciary
obligation played a critical role in the company's failure.
Canadian boards may be equally vulnerable to the incentives for
shirking and self-dealing that the current regime creates.
Further, Part II discusses the need to recast fiduciary obligation
in a manner that accounts for the multiple interests implicated
in corporate activity.
Part III examines the Canadian securities regulation
regime. This part tracks regulatory change post-Enron, and the
inherent limitations of some of these recent changes. Part IV
discusses the potential for shareholder activism in Canada-an
activism that is at its nascent stage. This part also poses
suggestions for recasting the manner in which investors,
including equity, debt, and human capital investors, view their
role in governance of the corporation. Part V briefly examines
the role of auditors and industry analysts as gatekeepers,
focusing on the numerous conflicts of interest that have become
entrenched in our securities regime.
Finally, the Article concludes that Canadian regulators,
stock exchanges, corporations, and legislators have failed to
engage in an adequate appraisal of corporate governance post-
Enron. The enhanced disclosure requirements are solely aimed
at increasing the wealth of equity investors, completely
bypassing the debate regarding why property in this context is a
higher value measure of effective governance than protection of
other investments in the firm. Even within the shareholder
primacy model, post-Enron securities and corporate law
developments have only offered limited additional protection for
shareholders, indicating the continuing potential harm even to
equity capital investors. Until there is the political will to
engage in more fundamental change, Canadian stakeholders will
be vulnerable to Enron-type conduct.
I. ENRON AS CON
Enron was considered an industry innovator. It was a high-
tech global corporation that traded energy contracts as
marketable commodities.8 A U.S. Senate Committee Report
8 See S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 7 (2002).
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concluded that Enron's strategy of utilizing these contracts as
marketable commodities enabled it to develop and run its on-line
energy trading business "outside of existing controls on
investment companies and commodity brokers."9  Enron
developed increasingly complicated transactions in order to
enhance its credit rating and meet the heavy financing needs
required to settle its energy contracts traded at the close of each
business day. These transactions included:
[Elnergy contracts [that] Enron called "prepays" in which
Enron was paid a large sum in advance to deliver... energy
products over a period of years; designing hedges to reduce
[risks inherent in] long-term energy delivery contracts; and
pooling energy contracts and securitizing them through bonds
or other financial instruments sold to investors. 10
Enron's financing strategy also included making itself "asset
light," by selling or syndicating its more traditional assets (such
as capital intensive power plants) outright, or marketing
interests in the assets to investors. The problem was the
counterparties to these transactions. Rather than sell these
property interests to third parties willing to invest in Enron's
assets or share the substantial risks associated with long-term
energy production facilities and delivery contracts, Enron sold
these interests to "unconsolidated affiliates," which were not
included in its financial statements, but rather were closely
linked with the corporation.1' Thus, the normal scrutiny that an
independent third party would bring to the financial feasibility
of this strategy was absent. Moreover, the off-balance sheet
liabilities obscured both Enron's financial status and the level of
risk involved in the energy contracts.
Enron also relied "on complicated transactions with
convoluted financing and accounting structures, including
transactions with multiple special purpose entities (SPEs),
hedges, derivatives, swaps, forward contracts, prepaid contracts,
and other forms of structured finance."1 2 While some of these
devices are currently utilized by corporations to assist in
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 7-8 (stating that by October 2000, Enron had a "total of $60 billion in
assets, of which about $27 billion, or nearly 50 percent, were lodged with Enron's
'unconsolidated affiliates' ").
12 Id. at 8.
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financing and risk diversification, they are typically made with
independent third parties that are acquiring some portion of the
business risk in exchange for the upside benefits of the
corporation's economic activity.
Enron's accounting treatment of these transactions
increased the immediate reported returns on its financial
statements. These statements disguised Enron's actual level of
running liability and did not indicate that Enron was essentially
hedging its own risks-hence, the "con." Enron's strategy of
obscuring the true nature of the transactions also created
conditions ripe for self-dealing transactions by managers.
Enron's Board of Directors (the "Board"), while aware of
these transactions, viewed them through "rose-colored glasses."
The Senate Committee Report documents numerous occasions
where warning signals were presented to the directors, and they
consistently failed to question the transactions or the accounting
practices. The partial list that follows gives the reader a sense of
how heavily tinted those rose-colored lenses must have been.
In 1999, the Board was advised that Enron was using
accounting practices that pushed the limits of acceptable
practice, yet it failed to question why this was necessary or
prudent. 13 The Board also failed to question why Enron's gross
revenues jumped from $40 billion to $100 billion from 1999 to
2000.14 The Board approved moving Whitewing, an affiliated
company, off Enron's books, "while guaranteeing its debt with
$1.4 billion in Enron stock and helping it obtain funding for the
purchase of Enron's assets." 5 Board members also signed off,
without question or objection, on Enron's 10-K filings in 1999
and 2000 that recorded over 3,000 separate related entities, with
over 800 organized in well-known offshore jurisdictions. 16
On three separate occasions in 1999 and 2000, the Board
approved unprecedented arrangements, which allowed Enron's
CFO to set up private equity funds (the "LJM partnerships") to
do business with Enron for the purpose of improving Enron's
financial statements.' 7 The Board waived the company's code of
conduct, which prohibited Enron employees from obtaining
13 See id. at 12.
14 See id.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 23.
17 See id. at 24.
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personal financial gain from a company doing business with
Enron. Such a waiver was contrary to prohibitions on conflict of
interest transactions; it allowed the CFO to establish and
operate off-the-books entities designed solely to transact
business with Enron.'8
The Board's subsequent failure to monitor these
transactions resulted in the LJM partnerships realizing
hundreds of millions of dollars of profit at Enron's expense. 19
Since the LJM partnerships essentially transacted business only
with Enron, all these profits were at Enron's expense. For
example, on several occasions, the LJM partnerships purchased
Enron assets and then sold them back to Enron at a higher
price.20 The LJM partnerships reaped a termination fee of $35
million when Enron unwound the Raptor transactions, discussed
in the next paragraph, even though the hedging arrangement
should have resulted in the LJM partnership paying Enron.21
The CFO was on both sides of the negotiating table in these
transactions. In October 2001, the CFO advised the Enron
Board that he had earned $45 million on a $5 million investment
in the LJM partnerships in just two years. 22
In 2000, the Board approved several sets of complex
transactions called the Raptors, despite questionable accounting
and ongoing risk to the company.23 It is likely that these
transactions led to Enron's collapse. The purpose of the Raptors
was to improve Enron's financial statements. 24 The Raptor
transactions involved setting up SPEs using highly questionable
financing transactions through the LJM partnerships to
allegedly meet the requirement of independent equity. The LJM
partnerships contributed $30 million to each Raptor, giving the
appearance of separate equity investment in the SPEs, only to
have that investment paid back out to the LJM partnerships
with a $10 million profit on each Raptor SPE six months later-
leaving claims on Enron's stock as the Raptors' only asset.25 The
Raptor SPEs thus appeared to hedge millions of dollars in
18 See id. at 24-25.
19 Id. at 24.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 37.
23 Id. at 37-38.
24 Id. at 47.
25 Id. at 46.
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volatile investments, when essentially Enron was
inappropriately hedging its own risk, unknown to its investors
and creditors. 26 The result was that losses of almost $1 billion
were "conceal[ed] from the market ... by creating an appearance
that [the] investments were hedged [by a third party; i.e., that
the] third party was obligated to pay Enron the amount of those
losses," when in reality the third party was an entity in which
the major stakeholder was Enron.27 When the value of the
assets that were the object of the alleged hedges began to fall,
there was "no economic substance-no assets or capital-[in the
Raptors] to support the so-called hedges, other than claims on
Enron's own stock or stock contracts."28 Further questionable
transactions and accounting sleights of hand created an
unstoppable downward spiral in value. 29 Only at this point did
Enron's outside auditor reverse its earlier opinion of the "proper
accounting for the Raptors," deciding that the Raptor SPEs could
not "continue to 'hedge' Enron's investment losses."30  This
resulted in a recorded "$710 million charge to earnings;...
investment losses that the Raptors no longer concealed."31 It
also resulted in a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity
because of the auditor's changed opinion as to appropriate
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in accounting
for the Raptor transactions. 32 In turn, investors reacted by
selling shares, triggering a decline in stock price, a lowered
26 Each of the Raptor SPEs was funded with only two types of assets; $30
million provided by LJM, which was temporary and to be paid back as $40 million
within six months, and stock and stock contracts provided by Enron. In each case,
LJM received its repayment and profit of $10 million, leaving claims on Enron stock
and stock contracts as the Raptors' only asset. Enron's liability for the Raptors was
further increased in March 2001 by restructuring of transactions that committed
further Enron shares, exacerbating the risk to Enron because Enron was effectively
required to provide as many Enron shares as necessary to satisfy the Raptor
"hedges." The Senate Committee Investigation found ample evidence of the Board's
knowledge of these transactions. See id. at 46-48; see also the Report of
Investigation by the Special Investigative Comm. of the Board of Directors of Enron
Corp., at 97 (February 1, 2002), available at
www.enron.com/corp/pressroomlreleases/2002/ene/docs/020202releaseltr.pdf
[hereinafter Powers Report].
27 Powers Report, supra note 26, at 4, 133; see also S. REP. No. 107-70, at 44.
28 S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 44.
29 Id. at 44-45.
30 Id. at 45.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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credit rating, and eventually, bankruptcy.33 The United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concluded in April
2002 that Enron's "financial statements were unreliable and the
book value of its assets would have to be written-down as much
as $24 billion."34
The above-cited examples of the failure of corporate
directors to question or challenge these transactions are well
documented by the Enron Special Investigative Committee
Report (the "Powers Report") and the Senate Committee
Report. 35 While the reader is well advised to read the reports to
acquire a full appreciation of what transpired, these examples
starkly reveal the failure of the corporate and securities law
regime to safeguard investors. The abuses are almost
inconceivable when tallied. On any measure of effective
governance, the corporate directors failed. 36  The Senate
Committee concluded that "[w]hile the evidence indicate[d] that,
in some instances, Enron Board members were misinformed ...
overall the Board received substantial information about Enron's
plans and activities and explicitly authorized or allowed many of
the questionable Enron strategies," transactions and high-risk
accounting practices. 37 The Board failed to exercise any effective
oversight that would have ensured the integrity of corporate
transactions and appropriate disclosures to the investing public.
The Board sanctioned the opaque accounting practices and failed
to monitor officers' conduct. The end result was "Enron as con,"
with devastating losses to tens of thousands of investors,
creditors, employees, and pension beneficiaries.
II. DIRECTORS WITH ROSE-COLORED GLASSES
The classic law and economics view of corporate governance
is that it is necessary for directors to exercise effective oversight
in order to create a cost effective means to ensure that corporate
officers make efficient decisions to generate wealth for the
shareholders and to ensure that they do not engage in
managerial opportunism or shirking. The notion of "Enron as
33 Id.
34 Id. at 11.
35 See supra note 26.
36 S. REP. No. 107-70, at 13. The Powers Report came to the same conclusion.
See Powers Report, supra note 26, at 22.
37 S. REP. No. 107-70, at 13.
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con" and the officer self-dealing transactions are precisely what
this approach is aimed at preventing. The Enron directors were
in a position to prevent many of the failures in governance that
occurred. The fact that this did not occur is in part a function of
board culture and lack of diversity in representation on the
Board. Enron directors were long serving directors, with
financial ties to the corporation and unquestioning loyalty to the
officers. This culture created complacency instead of a demand
for accountability, and a failure to protect investors from
inappropriate transactions and accounting irregularities. The
Senate Committee Report concluded:
The Enron directors failed in their fiduciary obligations to
safeguard Enron shareholders and "fail[ed] to recognize [their]
fiduciary obligations to set the company's overall strategic
direction, oversee management, and ensure responsible
financial reporting;"38the Enron directors contributed to
Enron's collapse by allowing the corporation to engage in
"inappropriate conflict of interest transactions," extensive off-
the books activities, and excessive executive compensation; 39
"[tihe Enron Board of Directors knowingly allowed Enron [to
engage] in high risk accounting practices; '40
"[d]espite clear conflicts of interest, the Enron Board of
Directors approved an unprecedented arrangement allowing
Enron's [CFO] to establish and operate the LJM private equity
funds which transacted business with Enron and profited at
Enron's expense. The Board exercised inadequate oversight of
the LJM transaction[s] and compensation controls and failed to
protect Enron shareholders from unfair dealing;"41
"[tihe Enron Board of Directors knowingly allowed Enron to
conduct billions of dollars in off-the-books activity to make its
financial condition appear better than it was, and [the
directors] failed to ensure adequate public disclosure of
material off-the-book liabilities that contributed to Enron's
collapse;"42
"[tihe Enron Board... approved excessive compensation for
company executives, failed to monitor the cumulative cash
38 Id. at 14.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 38.
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drain caused by Enron's 2000 annual bonus and performance
unit plans, and failed to monitor or halt abuse by [the] Board
Chair and [CEO] ... of a company-financed, multi-million
dollar, personal credit line";43
there was a lack of independence of Enron directors;
"independence... was compromised by financial ties between
the company and certain Board members," including lucrative
consulting fees in addition to their director compensation, and
major financial donations to organizations in which board
members were directly involved and from which they received
income;44 and
"[t]he [Enron] Board also failed to ensure the independence of
the company's auditor, allowing Andersen to provide internal
audit and consulting services [as well as] serving as Enron's
outside auditor."45
The Senate Committee made a series of recommendations
to prevent such governance failures in the future. They include
strengthening oversight by having directors of publicly traded
companies take steps to:
(a) prohibit accounting practices and transactions that put the
company at high risk of non-compliance with GAAP and result
in misleading and inaccurate financial statements;
(b) prohibit conflict of interest arrangements that allow
company transactions with a business owned or operated by
senior company personnel;
(c) prohibit off-the-books activity used to make the company's
financial condition appear better than it is, and require full
public disclosure of all assets, liabilities and activities that
materially affect the company's financial condition;
(d) prevent excessive executive compensation, including by-
(i) exercising ongoing oversight of compensation plans and
payments;
(ii) barring the issuance of company-financed loans to
directors and senior officers of the company; and
(iii) preventing stock-based compensation plans that
encourage company personnel to use improper accounting
or other measures to improperly increase the company
43 Id. at 52.
44 Id. at 54-56.
45 Id. at 54.
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stock price for personal gain; and
(e) prohibit the company's outside auditor from also providing
internal auditing or consulting services to the company and
from auditing its own work for the company.46
The Senate Committee also recommended strengthening
board independence by having the SEC and self-regulatory
organizations, such as the national stock exchanges:
(a) strengthen requirements for Director independence at
publicly traded companies, including by requiring a majority of
the outside Directors to be free of material financial ties to the
company other than through Director compensation;
(b) strengthen requirements for Audit Committees at publicly
traded companies, including by requiring the Audit Committee
Chair to possess financial management or accounting expertise,
and by requiring a written Audit Committee charter that
obligates the Committee to oversee the company's financial
statements and accounting practices and to hire and fire the
outside auditor; and
(c) strengthen requirements for auditor independence .... 47
The Senate Committee findings mirror those of the Powers
Report, which found that, despite clear conflicts of interest for
the CFO, the Enron Board inappropriately approved related-
party transactions and subsequently failed to monitor these
transactions in a meaningful way.48 The Powers Report also
found that the Board failed to question or consider the auditor's
report that a significant hazard of the related party transactions
was the "accounting risk" associated with the transactions.49
Recent Canadian studies have advocated strengthening the
audit committees of corporate boards. In Beyond Compliance,
the Joint Committee on Corporate Governance made numerous
recommendations regarding financial literacy of audit committee
members, independence and accountability. 50
The failures of effective oversight commenced with the "rose-
46 Id. at 4.
47 Id.
48 See Powers Report, supra note 26, at 148, 162-68 (discussing the conflicts
and criticizing the attempted remedial measures).
49 See id. at 25.
50 See J. COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: BUILDING A
GOVERNANCE CULTURE, at App. C (final report Nov. 2001) [hereinafter BEYOND
COMPLIANCE] (listing the ten recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Audit Committee Effectiveness).
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colored" glasses. Enron's corporate culture rewarded high-risk
ventures, aggressive market behavior, and accounting that
maximized reported earnings. Hesitation, questioning, or
careful risk assessment were not part of the corporate program.
The Board not only failed to exercise oversight, but as recently
as during the Senate Committee hearings, Board members
continued to state that they had done nothing wrong.5' The rosy
view of corporate officers led to the approval of transactions that
were clearly a conflict of interest for corporate executives and a
breach of the directors' duty of care in allowing the transactions
to proceed. The same rosy lens affected the corporate monitoring
structures so that the Board failed completely in following
through, and thus did not detect extensive self-dealing by
corporate officers.52
The first reaction of Canadian securities regulators and
stock exchanges was that an Enron could not happen in Canada;
it was our northern version of the rose-colored glasses. Market
reaction in Canada suggested that investors were not as
confident. Enron was not considered an isolated incident of
failed oversight and investors did not have a rosy picture of the
implications for Canadian corporate governance. In Canada, the
hallmarks of good governance have been effective and
independent oversight of the corporate board, transparency of
corporate transactions, director accountability to shareholders,
and auditors and similar professionals as gatekeepers or
protectors of the integrity of the disclosure process. All of these
elements are present in the United States regime as well. Yet,
alone or in combination, they did not provide a check on
corporate misconduct. Thus, at least to some degree, a similar
governance failure could occur in Canada. Canada has had its
share of securities scandals in the past, Bre-X to name one
example, but nothing approaching the magnitude of Enron.53
Effective oversight requires that corporate directors be able to
think separately and independently from corporate officers. It is
not sufficient merely to appoint corporate directors who do not
meet the statutory definition of related directors. Rather, the
board requires an ability to represent and present diverse views
51 See S. REP. No. 107-70, at 13-14.
52 See id. at 13.
53 See Jeffrey Macintosh, Lessons of Bre-X (?) Some Comments, 32 CANADA BUS.
L.J. 223 (1999).
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on corporate activity, and to engage in healthy discussion and
debate on the efficacy, goals, and risks of transactions that affect
the financial and economic health of the corporation.
A. Lack of Diversity of the Corporate Board
The Enron Board was comprised of fifteen directors, several
of whom had been on the Board of Enron or its predecessor
companies for more than twenty years. 54 All but two were
ostensibly independent directors, although, as noted above,
many received lucrative consulting fees or donations to their
place of employment or favorite charity. The Senate Committee
Report discloses that in 2000 Enron directors received $350,000
in cash and equity compensation-more than twice the national
average for board compensation at U.S. publicly traded
corporations. 55 Marleen O'Connor has also observed that all but
one of the directors were male and that almost all were white
business officers. 56 All these factors created a board culture that
was unquestioning and far too homogeneous to provide for
healthy scrutiny and monitoring of the corporate officers. Thus,
"independent directors" is in itself insufficient guarantee of
independent oversight. The Powers Report also found that the
Audit Committee of the Board consisted of independent
directors, but that they failed to investigate or give serious
consideration to the related party transactions. The failure was
exacerbated by the advice of Enron's auditor, with its multiple
and conflicting interests. 57
Scholars Lynne Dallas and Marleen O'Connor have written
about the dynamics of corporate boards and the problems
associated with a lack of diversity of views and backgrounds,
including the inability to question particular transactions, the
need for conformity, the failure to bring diverse views to
consideration of strategic decisions, fewer skills sets and
experience to contribute to risk assessment, and a sense of
morality that precludes questioning or challenge of group
decisions. 58 Using Irving Janis' groupthink theory, O'Connor has
54 See S. REP. No. 107-70, at 8.
55 Id. at 11.
56 Marleen O'Connor, Address at the American and Canadian Law and Society
Joint Conference (June 2002).
57 Powers Report, supra note 26, at 17.
58 Lynne Dallas, Developments in U.S. Boards of Directors and the Multiple
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suggested that "groupthink" generated by shared backgrounds,
financial incentives to bond together, and a board culture
promoting unquestioning loyalty to Enron officers, prevented the
Enron Board from critically evaluating decisions, and led to a
sense of invulnerability in risk-taking decisions. 59
Problems associated with lack of diversity on corporate
boards also exist in Canada. Women hold only 11.9% of
corporate board seats, with very few non-white directors. 60
Canadian corporate boards tend to be almost entirely comprised
of CEOs or former CEOs of other companies, because officer
experience is generally thought to be an essential prerequisite
for corporate directorship. Given that few women are CEO's,
this creates a type of pre-selection. It also assumes that these
are the only skills required by a corporate board. Boards have
failed to recognize the contributions of women to corporate
activity. Cohesiveness and compatibility are considered
important qualities for a corporate director; however,
compatibility is different from homogeneity. This lack of
diversity creates the same risks of unquestioning conduct that
occurred in Enron.
Canada faces additional challenges because many of its
publicly traded corporations are closely held, and thus majority
or controlling shareholders greatly influence who is nominated to
corporate boards and how the "best interests of the corporation"
get defined. While the closely held nature of publicly traded
corporations may result in closer monitoring of officer
performance, it can also increase the risk of collusion between
controlling shareholders and corporate officers to the detriment
of other investors.
A recent survey of corporations found that Canadian
corporations may look increasingly to women for board seats
because of the growing recognition of the need for financial
literacy skills on boards and because women tend to occupy
positions in the accounting and auditing fields. Women drawn
from senior ranks of the accounting profession, however, are
Roles of Corporate Boards, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS (forthcoming 2003); O'Connor, supra note 56.
59 O'Connor, supra note 56.
60 See Canadian Women's Bus. Network, Catalyst Census Posts Solid Gains in
Percentage of Women Corporate Officers in America's Largest 500 Corporations
(Nov. 11, 1999), available at http://www.cdnbizwomen.com/resources/catalystll.
html.
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likely to represent the same privileged class as current directors
and thus, this shift will not necessarily create the diversity of
views that would truly enhance corporate governance. Diversity
requires representation not only by gender and race, but by
different socio-economic classes in order to have the skills,
information, perspective, and resources that will collectively
enhance oversight. CEO experience is not essential for all
directors; the board's role is to exercise oversight, not to manage
the corporation. Financial literacy and other directing skills can
be acquired, but the perspective of diverse stakeholders may be
critical in how the board examines transactions that have the
potential risk of creating consumer or investor harms, negative
effects on products markets, environmental sustainability
risk/benefits, and other transactions with broader social and
economic costs. Given the economic status of women and their
multiple caregiving responsibilities in our society, women
frequently assess opportunity costs and transaction costs
differently. This perspective is potentially valuable in enhancing
corporate decision-making, particularly if that decision-making
is recast to consider multiple equity, human capital and other
investors in the firm. 61 Importing a different mix of norms into
the cost/benefit analysis engaged in by corporate officers has the
potential to recast the calculus of corporate decisions, including
consideration of costs to workers' lives, human rights, and the
environment. Incorporating views from diverse racial
backgrounds should generate a higher awareness of the need to
not only comply with basic human rights laws, but to work
towards eliminating discrimination in corporate operations, both
domestically and internationally.
In post-Enron Canada, there is considerable debate
regarding the current structure of board audit committees and
whether they provide a sufficient check and objective assessment
of the activities of corporate officers and their agents, and
whether their mandate is sufficient to guard against self-dealing
transactions. Canadian corporate boards are clearly vulnerable
to the same kinds of influences that were faced by the corporate
board in Enron. Absent diversity, board culture can create a
dependence on corporate officers and an unquestioning culture
61 For a further discussion of this issue, see SARRA, supra note 7 (manuscript at
ch. 3).
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that prevents more objective assessment of particular
transactions. -While a cohesive board is essential to timely and
effective decision-making, excessive cohesion prevents critical
assessment of peer decision-making. In addition to assessing
officer performance, there must be effective peer review of
director performance. Integrity of financial standards is a key
element of effective governance. The corporate board must have
strong audit and strategic planning processes. The Enron fiasco
has also highlighted the complex and nuanced relationship of the
audit committee with external auditors.
With the move to global capital markets, corporate boards
also need to offer a system of internal accountability for financial
reporting and governance decisions in order to offer
international investors some assurance of the upside potential of
investing in the firm. There must be a deeper appreciation of
cultural and social differences and different normative standards
of good corporate conduct.
B. Fiduciary Obligation and "Investor Blues"
As noted above, the Senate Committee investigation found a
failure by the Enron Board to meet its fiduciary obligations.
Fiduciary obligations provide the normative standard against
which the conduct and business judgments of directors and
officers are measured. Fiduciary obligation is, therefore, central
to an effective corporate governance strategy-a strategy that
establishes a direction for the corporation, ensures oversight
over corporate officers and their agents, and maximizes
corporation wealth. The fiduciary obligation within the Anglo-
American corporate law paradigm is almost exclusively to
shareholders, although it can shift to creditors once a corporation
becomes insolvent.
Enron was a failure in fiduciary obligation, not only to
shareholders but also to others implicated in the corporation's
activity. Given the normative pressure to report sustained
short-term earnings in order to impress shareholders, the
directors failed to meet their fiduciary obligation to engage in
careful oversight. This produced disastrous results for equity
investors, as well as others. In this respect, casting fiduciary
obligation narrowly was detrimental to the long-term interests of
equity investors. Faith Kahn has cogently analyzed how United
States state corporate fiduciary law and federal securities law
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support the principle of director responsibility, but courts and
regulators have been reluctant to enforce this duty through
personal liability, even where fraudulent conduct has been
proven.62 Kahn suggests that the failure of regulators and courts
to hold violators personally accountable contributed to a sense of
invincibility among Enron's directors and officers. 63
Investor woes created by Enron's misconduct were
particularly egregious because of the large number of small
investors who sustained losses, including workers who had
placed much of their surplus income in Enron as a retirement
strategy. There is a distinction between equity investors who
have tied-up their life savings in the markets in hopes of
securing their share of the supposed "culture of generous equity
return" and larger investors, whose actual capital investment is
a greater dollar amount, but which represents a smaller portion
of their total equity investments. Institutional investors are
obligated through their fiduciary and trust obligations to
diversify risk, thereby limiting the impact of any particular
corporate failure. Moreover, many larger investors manage
other people's capital and thus their personal equity capital is
not at risk. Shareholders, therefore, have radically different risk
capabilities, investment timelines, risk diversification
capabilities, and information and resources to monitor corporate
activity. Not only does this influence the short-term versus long-
term investment and return timelines, it also has direct
implications for the type of risks in which shareholders wish
corporations to engage. While optimal investment practice
assumes diversification of portfolios and ease of exit if equity.
investors are dissatisfied with corporate performance, these
make huge assumptions about the sophistication of investors. It
also requires a deeper appreciation of the power relationships,
even within the existing shareholder wealth maximization
paradigm. It is not enough merely to disclose corporate activity;
a regulatory framework that recognizes these differences must
be created.
Recognition of these distinctions in the nature of equity
investment could also make investor preferences more visible.
The current paradigm assumes that shareholders' sole concern is
62 See Kahn, supra note 3, at 1627-28.
63 See id.
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the maximization of shareholder return. Yet small investors are
more likely to identify with the need to prevent corporate
misconduct because they are themselves workers, consumers,
parents, and community members. A recent survey of 2,006
Canadian adults, more than a third of whom were shareholders,
found that seventy-four percent believe that corporate officers
have a responsibility, in addition to profit making, to take into
account the impact of their decisions on employees, local
communities, and the country.64 The governance debate has not
been responsive to these indicators of public sentiment.
The most disappointing element of the governance debate
post-Enron is that fiduciary obligation is not being more fully
explored and re-conceptualized. Clearly, its current
manifestation has limits even for shareholder protection. Yet
there is a more fulsome analysis of the corporation that
recognizes wealth maximization as the product of multiple
inputs, equity capital investors, debt lenders, trade creditors,
employee labor, loyalty and innovative contributions, and
community infrastructure that supports the corporation's
activities. These are all investments in the firm. Elsewhere I
have suggested that the interests of creditors, workers, and other
stakeholders run along a continuum of residual interest
requiring that the shareholder wealth maximization paradigm
be recast to recognize all the investments and interests in the
corporation. 65 Yet the shareholder primacy norm continues to be
deeply imbedded in Canadian and U.S. corporate law. While the
language of corporate law specifies decision making in the "best
interests of the corporation," that language has been consistently
interpreted by the courts as referring to the best interests of the
shareholders. Nonetheless, shareholders are not the only
investors in the firm.
In part, this shareholder-centric focus arises because of the
inherent conflict in securities regulation and corporate law.
Securities law is aimed at protecting investors of issuing
corporations, and thus by definition has shareholders as its
64 See Canadian Democracy and Corp. Accountability Comm., The New Balance
Sheet: Corporate Profits and Responsibility in the 21st Century (Jan. 2002),
available at http://www.corporate-accountability.ca/pdfs/FullReport2002.pdf
[hereinafter The New Balance Sheet].
65 See Janis Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadian
and International Developments, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1691 (2002).
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primary concern. In responding to the recent market failures,
securities regulators have increasingly focused on deficiencies in
corporate governance that give rise to investor harms. There are
parallels between these trends and legislative responses to
employment standards and environmental protection, where
regulators imposed responsibilities on corporate decision makers
to deter misconduct that creates harms identified as contrary to
public policy. The difference is that given the hierarchy of
property in public and private law, securities reform has
continually worked to reinforce the notion of shareholder
primacy in corporate governance. Yet arguably, the "bundle of
rights" enjoyed by shareholders are comparable in terms of
public policy priorities to the bundle of rights enjoyed by others
with interests or investments in the corporation. Shareholder
primacy in corporate governance is therefore a contestable
notion. Yet there continues to be inadequate conceptualization of
the optimal model of corporate governance that reflects these
dynamics.
Generally, law and economics scholars have suggested that
shareholders, as residual claimants to the value of the firm's
assets, have the greatest incentive to monitor managers and
thus the shareholder primacy norm will prevent managerial
opportunism or shirking. The logic of this rationale, however, is
questionable in light of Enron. It is not merely the alleged fraud
of Enron's senior officers, but rather a more deeply pervasive
problem of Board passivity so long as Enron appeared to be
providing incredible returns to shareholders. This creates ex
ante incentives for corporate officers to neglect their fiduciary
and statutory duties in favor of the mantra of shareholder
return. It also creates enormous incentive to engage in self-
dealing transactions, fraud, and less than transparent reporting
on financial and other corporate activity.
The incentives are not a one-way street. William Bratton
has observed that the short-term shareholder return pressures
from increasingly concentrated institutional investors also
created undue pressure to enhance balance sheet reporting.66
Both Bratton and O'Connor have suggested that Enron's "rank
and yank" system, where senior 'employees were ranked, and
66 See William Bratton, Enron: The Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1331 (2002).
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those at the bottom of the curve fired, created a corporate culture
where "winners took all" and officers' decisions were not
questioned. 67 The Powers Report also discussed the system of
employee loyalty, where questioning transactions meant
dismissal. 68 The highly competitive nature of Enron's workplace
is counter-intuitive to the way in which women generally work.
Studies document that women generally bring skills of
collaboration, problem solving, care giving, and risk assessment
that considers broader interests to the workplace. Such skills
were antithetical to the corporate culture at Enron and clearly
not the skill set rewarded at the officer level.
The Enron Board's failure to ensure that adequate
monitoring and accountability mechanisms were in place was a
key breach of fiduciary obligation. Lessons can be drawn from
other aspects of corporate law in this respect. In other contexts,
Canadian corporate directors have been put on notice that their
oversight obligations include monitoring and prevention
programs. These arise where there is clear public policy and
statutory regulation that assigns personal responsibility to
directors for corporate misconduct or failures to act. In Canada,
environmental law is perhaps the strongest example. The
landmark decision on director liability in environmental
protection is R. v. Bata Industries Ltd.,69 in which the court held
that due diligence is established where the directors and/or
officers exercised all reasonable care by establishing a proper
system to prevent the commission of environmental offences and
by taking reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of
the monitoring system. As a result of the Bata judgment,
Canadian courts are very clear on their application of directors'
obligations in respect of environmental protection. The courts
will examine whether: directors established a pollution
prevention program; the program was inspected or supervised;
each director ensured that corporate officers had been instructed
to set up a system for ensuring compliance with environmental
laws; officers of the corporation reported back periodically to the
67 See id.; O'Connor, supra note 56.
68 See Powers Report, supra note 26, at 97.
69 [19921 9 O.R.3d 329, 339, modified, [19931 14 O.R.3d 354, modified, [19951 25
O.R.3d 321 (finding that the degree of reasonable care to be exercised depends on
the circumstances of the case and the precise language of the environmental
protection legislation).
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board on operation of the system; officers had been instructed to
report any substantial non-compliance to the board of directors
in a timely manner; a system of ongoing environmental auditing
was in place; training programs were in place; and other indices
of a pro-active environmental policy were present.70 These
preventive, monitoring, reporting, and training obligations could
just as easily be applied to financial reporting, human rights
compliance, labor standards, and stakeholder protection. While
the tests are common law, they arise out of relatively strong
environmental protection legislation that also imposes personal
liability on corporate directors and officers for failure of the
corporation to comply with statutory standards. Thus, to
mitigate the risk of rose-colored director views of corporate
activity, legislated standards need to focus the lens of director
activity. Attaching personal responsibility to engage in effective
risk assessment of various capital investments can sharpen and
sustain that focus.
Corporate directors should ensure compliance not only with
the law but also with the spirit of laws aimed at elimination of
gender and racial discrimination and other corporate activity
that has social and economic harm for society. Costs need to be
measured to account for harms that are currently considered
externalities. It is not sufficient to require securities disclosure
of transactions "material" to the financial status of the
corporation if the costs are externalized and thus never
considered material.
A more fundamental rethinking of fiduciary obligation
should include accountability to multiple stakeholders. Kellye
Testy has suggested that one can work within the existing
corporate law paradigm and also undertake a more fundamental
re-conceptualization that will maximize social wealth. The
suggested method utilizes shareholders and consumers to ensure
that public laws and standards such as human rights and
environmental protection are key parts of corporate objectives. 71
Cheryl Wade has observed that the governance problems
identified by the Enron failure should not overshadow the
persistent lack of board oversight of human rights compliance,
70 See id.; see also R. DAVIS & J. SARRA, DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY IN
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY, at ch. 8 (2001).
71 See Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive
Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1243-1247 (2002).
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which has led to enormous costs to investors from loss of civil
anti-discrimination suits.72 Professor Wade suggests that
racially toxic corporate activity is economically costly in terms of
harm to employees, loss of goodwill, cost of fighting civil suits,
and losses to the corporate balance sheet and to investors. 73 She
concludes that workplace discrimination continues to exist
because boards fail to accept the inevitable wrongdoing of at
least some managers and employees, thus, if the board is
responsible for complying with the law, socially responsible
corporate behavior may be enhanced.74
The notion of fiduciary obligation and "equitable treatment"
of shareholders and other stakeholders differs normatively
across national borders and a cross-cultural theory must be
developed to inform corporate governance norms, including the
economic and social implications of gender, race, and class.7 5
Much further cross-cultural collaborative research is needed to
fully understand these influences, including how risks and
benefits are assessed in terms of corporate activity in other
corporate law paradigms. In the Anglo-American system, the
voices of racial minorities are not represented in the corporate
boardroom, and often not in the plant or office either, because
they cannot get access to these jobs. Women of color are doubly
disadvantaged by corporate policies and conduct that do not
recognize their contributions to the corporation's productive
activity. Diversity on corporate boards can enhance governance
by generating new ideas and approaches to corporate decision-
making, engaging in more rigorous monitoring, and eliminating
pervasive forms of discrimination. Some costs not currently
accounted for are social and economic harms caused by current
corporate restructuring and global positioning; the full costs of
corporate activity, including harms from harassment, health,
and safety risks; and environmental and tort harms. Until these
costs are allocated to corporations and their decision-makers in
terms of statutory and/or judicially imposed liability, a shift in
the normative paradigm is unlikely to occur.
72 See Cheryl Wade, The Interplay between Securities Regulation and Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism, the Shareholder Proposal Rule and Corporate
Compliance with the Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS (forthcoming 2003).
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See Sarra supra, note 65, at 1691.
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In Canada, the debate about stakeholder interest and re-
conception of the corporation is at a nascent stage. A January
2002 report by the Canadian Democracy and Corporate
Accountability Commission (the "Commission") has advanced
this debate by conducting national hearings and making a set of
recommendations aimed at enhancing corporate governance. 76 A
survey conducted for the Commission found that seventy-two
percent of Canadians accept the right of corporations to make
profits but also want corporations to accept a broader sense of
accountability that extends beyond profit maximization. 77
Eighty percent of Canadians want corporate social responsibility
standards established and a requirement that companies report
their compliance with such standards so that shareholders and
consumers can make informed decisions. 78 Thirty-six percent of
those surveyed were equity capital investors, and the survey
results revealed consistency in these views about corporate social
responsibility across both shareholding and non-shareholding
survey participants. 79 The survey8° indicates that the public
sentiment differs from the current dialogue among securities
regulators, stock exchanges and corporate officers, which persist
in governance reform in the context of the shareholder primacy
normative model. The Commission's recommendations for
reform of corporate governance include:
Urging corporations to develop governance structures that
facilitate a "corporate culture supportive of corporate social
responsibility," defined as the corporation responding to
interests in addition to the interests of shareholders, including
employees, suppliers, customers and communities;8'
having corporations establish a corporate social responsibility
board committee and appoint a senior executive as
ombudsperson responsible for corporate social responsibility;8 2
requiring corporations to disclose any corporate social
responsibility policies and practices in their annual reports or
76 See The New Balance Sheet, supra note 64, at 18-34.
77 See id. at 41.
78 See id. at 42.
79 See id. at 41.
80 See id. at 45-46. This poll, conducted with 2,006 adults through phone
interviews from September 28, 2001 through October 8, 2001, is considered accurate
within plus or minus 2.2%.
81 Id. at 31.
82 Id.
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annually in information circulars as a condition of listing on
Canadian stock exchanges, setting out their approach and
assessing the extent to which their practices conform to
corporate social responsibility guidelines set out in stock-
market listing rules;83
urging government to develop corporate social responsibility
guidelines with reference to established international "indexes
of corporate social responsibility;" 84
amending corporate laws to clarify the fiduciary obligations of
directors, specifically so that "directors do not disregard
entirely the interests of a company's shareholders in order to
confer a benefit on a non-shareholder, directors [in discharging
their duty to the corporation and in determining what they
reasonably believe to be the best interests of the corporation]
may consider" the effects of the corporation's actions on
"employees, customers, supplier and creditors," the
"communities in which the corporation operates," and the short
and long-term "interests of the corporation and its
shareholders;"8 5
requiring large companies to provide "social audit" information
on the implementation of corporate social responsibility policies
and practices;8
6
enacting a new law to protect employees against adverse
employment consequences for "whistle blowing" on corporate
non-compliance with laws;8 7
having "Canadian governments.., work diligently to ensure
that existing corporate, securities, consumer, health and safety,
criminal, environmental, food, water and other rules are
properly enforced;"88
having the Canadian government apply corporate social
responsibility criteria in purchasing and export promotion
decisions, requiring business to certify their adherence to core
corporate social responsibility activities if they wish to take
advantage of public resources; 89
allowing Canadian pension plan managers "to take corporate
83 Id. at 18-19.
84 Id. at 19.
8 Id. at 24-25.
86 Id. at 21.
87 Id. at 22.
88 Id. at 26.
89 Id. at 27-28.
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
social responsibility matters into account," and to "indicate in
their statements of investment policies and procedures whether
or not they take into account" corporate social responsibility
guidelines;90
letting the Canadian government promote multilateral
inclusion of a "social clause" in trade agreements as well as a
convention to outlaw violations of basic human rights, workers
rights, and environmental standards as a prerequisite to
membership in trade organizations. Failing success in three
years, the government should unilaterally require Canadian
companies to adhere to a core set of human rights standards in
their overseas operations; 91 and
enacting "laws barring corporate and union donations to
political parties and candidates," with greater public financing
provided to ensure adequate financing of the Canadian political
process.92
The recommendations are aimed both at enhancing
information to investors and the public, and requiring corporate
structures to make individual choices about corporate social
responsibility and disclose these choices. The recommendations
on fiduciary obligation, while important, need to be accompanied
by enforceable remedies by stakeholders with a direct interest in
the corporation, or such change would only mirror United States
constituency statutes, which in some instances have reduced, as
opposed to increased, accountability to stakeholders. The
Commission also makes an important link between the public
and private law aspects of corporate activity and electoral
democracy. The current shareholder wealth maximization
paradigm is a function of longstanding property relations and
those that are propertied are not going to divest their holdings in
favor of a fundamental re-conceptualization of the corporation. 93
This, however, does not preclude multiple shorter-term
strategies and new legislative standards that require
corporations to fully disclose and account for their conduct.
Statutory provisions enacting the Commission's
recommendations could also facilitate a potential alignment of
the interests of shareholders, workers, and other stakeholders in
90 Id. at 28.
91 Id. at 29-30.
92 Id. at 33-34.
93 See Sarra, supra note 65, at 1708-1711.
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having the corporation successfully generate wealth, -sustain
employment, and reduce human rights, environmental, and
other harms.
III. SECURITIES REGULATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION
Transparency and disclosure are the hallmarks of our
securities regime. Financial statements have been viewed as an
accurate source of information about a company's financial
condition, allowing investors to make informed investment
choices. Disclosure is viewed as the key element underpinning
an effective capital market structure. Investors rely on accurate
and informative financial statements in making decisions.
Corporate directors are assumed to be exercising effective
oversight in the reporting of such information. Post-Enron, the
question is whether corporations, in complying with financial
reporting requirements and in following GAAP in their
disclosure practice, are really providing investors with
information in a form that allows them to assess the risks and
benefits of investing in the firm. Each day, there are media
accounts of shaken public confidence in the market. Do GAAP
allow corporations to mask or fail to disclose particular
transactions, such that a more fundamental change in financial
accounting and disclosure is required?
A. Transparent Versus Opaque Accounting
The focus of securities regulators post-Enron is on failure in
accountability to equity investors and whether there is a need for
enhanced regulatory protection or simply better enforcement of
existing protection. The securities regime is aimed at regulating
the activities of publicly traded corporations in the protection of
investors. It sets the framework for how securities are offered
and traded, disclosure standards, and protection against insider
and other self-dealing transactions. These measures are all
aimed at transparency and creating a "level playing field" for
investors in their assessment of the risks and benefits of
investing in a particular enterprise. Given that the securities
regime is focused on the protection of property, it is focused on
protecting equity investors. This is a vitally important
regulatory function that assists in promoting economic growth
and productive activity. It is important to note, however, that
the distribution of property continues to be highly gendered,
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given the historical distribution of property, and thus these
protections are aimed at particular classes of people who have
the economic resources to invest capital. While the number of
individuals who invest is increasing, the proportion of capital
investment attributable to small investors is declining, and
institutional shareholders have become the main source of equity
capital investment in Canada.
In terms of investor protection, unlike the United States,
Canada has had a continuous disclosure regime. Corporations
are required to disclose material changes that affect a
corporation as they occur. The premise is that continuous
disclosure is essential to promotion of active securities markets
and enhanced investor protection. It is aimed at a continuous
dissemination of information to the market, and thus, at least on
paper, suggests that Canadian investors may be less vulnerable
to an Enron type disclosure failure. A company that is a
reporting issuer in Canada must comply with continuous
disclosure requirements through electronic filings on the SEDAR
system and public website.94
Enron operated under the periodic disclosure regime of the
United States and thus there were periods during which
numerous transactions that did not need to be immediately
reported to the market could occur. Moreover, while the United
States regime requires accuracy in corporate disclosures, it does
not require issuing companies to disclose all material changes.
Post-Enron, statutory changes initiated by the SEC will move
the U.S. system towards an enhanced disclosure regime,
requiring corporations to disclose a specified list of transactions
or events and to report their periodic earnings more quickly.95
A key question underlying the efficacy of the current
disclosure regime is the adequacy of corporate financial
94 See ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE
OBLIGATIONS, PROPOSED NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 51-102 (proposed June 21, 2002),
available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rules/rule_51-102-
_20020621_noticeroc.htm (posted by the Canada Securities Administration to seek
public comment on the disclosure requirements). Securities laws are aimed at the
standards of information to be disseminated when issuing new securities, the
ongoing requirements for information dissemination, and prohibitions on trading in
securities of an issuer by insiders where there is an undisclosed material fact or
material change.
95 See Peter Ramjug, SEC Rules to Quicken Firms' Filings, TORONTO GLOBE &
MAIL, Aug. 28, 2002, at B5.
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statements. Accounting standards in the United States have
resulted in narrowly written, detailed prescriptive rules,
allowing corporations to "check the boxes" in disclosing their
accounting practices. Enron's SPEs were a classic example of
this-liabilities were not consolidated on the financial
statements. Absent an overall shared understanding of a
standard of financial reporting and enhanced transparency on
corporate performance, narrow rule compliance creates
inappropriate ex ante incentives to obscure the financial
implications of particular transactions. The line between
"avoidance" and "evasion," to borrow a phrase from tax law, is
very fine. The Senate Committee Report called this "opaque"
disclosure.9 6  The dictionary defines "opaque" as non-
transparent, obscure, cloudy, impenetrable, and murky;97 these
are all suitable descriptions of Enron's financial reporting
practices.
B. Material Transactions Reporting and the Narrowness of the
Lens
A continuous disclosure regime is not without risks. A key
feature of the Canadian disclosure regime is reporting "material"
changes such that investors are fully informed of the business
and affairs of the corporation.98  In terms of disclosure
requirements themselves, there is considerable latitude in
defining what is a "material" event requiring disclosure. 99
Corporate officers, accountants, or other agents of the
corporation may meet the letter of the continuous disclosure
regime without meeting its spirit and intent, which is to provide
investors with disclosure such that they can make informed
choices. Short-term advantage from a liberal interpretation of
"non-material" can cause a loss of investor and market
confidence, with negative financial consequences for the
corporation.
"Material" refers to events or transactions that may affect
share or property value. 100 Thus, harms that are externalized
need not be identified on the corporation balance sheet or be
96 S. REP. No. 107-70, at 12 (2002).
97 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1579 (3d ed. 1993).
98 The New Balance Sheet, supra note 64, at 16.
99 See id. at 16-17.
100 See id. at 16.
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
reported as "material" because they allegedly do not have a
material impact on shareholder value. Such harms, are
considered to be part of the public law regime in terms of labor
standards or environmental law, and thus not part of the
securities law regime except where particular events have
impacted on shareholder value. Given this definition of
"material," transparency and disclosure are narrowly cast.
Investors are not exposed to the social and economic costs of
other harms being perpetrated by the corporation unless they
are likely to influence the bottom line. 1 1
A corporation should be obligated to disclose all costs
associated with corporate activity so that investors, creditors,
and other stakeholders can assess their continued investments.
Such costs are quantifiable using GAAP and economic indicators.
Even if including such costs on the corporate balance sheet is too
radical a notion for current legislators, the requirement to
disclose a separate balance sheet of the estimated social and
economic consequences of particular decisions would integrate
securities laws in the social and economic reality in which
corporations participate. An effective continuous disclosure
regime requires disclosure that is timely, relevant,
understandable, and aimed at treating investors equitably.
Securities law is "consumer protection for investors," and thus is
highly integrated with other public law protections such as
creditor enforcement systems; consumer protection; occupational
health and safety law; employment standards; and
environmental protection. To treat these laws separately, or cast
some activity as private and the rest as public law issues,
ignores the highly integrated public/private regulatory regime in
which Anglo-American corporations operate. If Enron directors
had been required to disclose the estimated social and economic
costs of the risky SPE transactions to investors, the transactions
would never have been approved. The directors would have
known that investor confidence would plummet and capital
would flee the corporation. Some might argue that such
disclosure would create too much volatility in the markets. That
volatility currently exists, however, precisely because investors
are not confident of current corporate disclosures. Corporations
should disclose any information that would help investors make
101 See id.
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knowledgeable decisions in respect of their investments.
Imposing a fiduciary obligation to report full estimated costs of
particular corporate conduct would enhance the quality of
decisions at the front end of the process.
It is equally important to recognize that not requiring
disclosure of these harms as part of the securities regime creates
ex ante incentives on the part of corporate officers to externalize
the costs of some activities. The social and economic effects of
labor shedding are a good illustration of this. While the financial
statement records a savings in massive downsizing, the costs to
the individuals from loss of deferred income, pension benefits,
costs of relocating, social costs to family, and ripple economic
effects on the community are not part of the disclosure as they
are not "material" to the bottom line of corporate profit. As
egregious as Enron-type failures in disclosures to investors are,
the attention that has been given to correcting the financial
disclosure regime is in part of function of property interests that
were harmed. Yet securities regulation does not operate in a
vacuum. It is situated in complex public and private law norms
regarding harms and protections for multiple interested parties.
The securities system should better recognize that equity
investors may well have an interest in greater disclosure of the
nature of corporate transactions that impact on these multiple
concerns.
In the same vein, investor education has been aimed at
discerning fraud, a focus reinforced post-Enron. Almost no
attention is paid to education to promote diversification and
reduction of risk, a key factor in the harms caused to Enron
employees as shareholders. Disclosure is likely to be more
effective where investor education includes instilling an ability
to understand and make effective use of material disclosures.
Moreover, little education or skills building is given to
shareholders that facilitate their ability to make investment
choices that reflect personal social and political beliefs. These
issues are symptomatic of much larger systemic change that is
required.
C. Regulatory Change Post-Enron
Post-Enron, a number of corporations have restated their
financial positions. This is largely a function of economic
incentives; an effort to restore market confidence; shareholders'
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increasing vigilance; fear of director and officer tort liability and
regulatory sanction; and an attempt to prevent further
intervention by government in reporting requirements. These
restatements have been buttressed by legislative initiatives such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, aimed at protecting investors
by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure
pursuant to U.S. securities laws.10 2 This includes compliance
with the new CEO and CFO certification requirements in respect
of the "truth" of future annual and quarterly reports and
disclosure of material facts; and certification that the financial
statement and other information fairly present the financial
condition the corporation. 10 3 The CEO and CFO must also
certify that they are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls, that those controls will ensure
that material information is conveyed to decision-makers, an
evaluation and report on the effectiveness of these controls, and
certification that they have disclosed to the corporation's auditor
and audit committee any significant deficiencies in internal
control and any fraud, material or not, that involved managers
or other employees who have a significant role in the company's
internal controls. 10 4 It also creates a public company accounting
oversight board to protect interests of investors and the "public
interest."'105
Canadian companies listed in the United States must
comply with the Act. 0 6 Moreover, Canadian listed companies
may feel some market pressure to comply with similar
certification in order to retain investor confidence. It is too soon
to gauge the effectiveness of the Act. Of particular interest to
Canadian regulators are the new certification requirements, as
Canada is likely to introduce similar officer certification
requirements in 2003.107 By placing direct responsibility on
CEOs and CFOs, there will be higher demand on auditors to
revise their accounting practices to move beyond GAAP.
Investors, whether they are domestic or international, want
102 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
103 See id. § 302 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7247).
104 See id. § 302(a)(4).
105 See id. § 101(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
106 See id.
107 David Brown, President, CICA, Remarks to Senate Comm. on Banking,
Trade and Commerce, at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/About/News/speeches.html.
(October 30, 2002).
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disclosure of information that identifies material risks or future
expected changes that have some probability of affecting the
value of their securities such that they can assess their
investment options. It remains to be seen whether or not the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act will really ensure transparency of corporate
reporting and enhance investor confidence or merely serve as a
new mechanism to insulate corporate officers. What is evident is
that in both Canada and the United States, securities regulators
have stepped up enforcement of securities law violations, which
in turn may have significant deterrent effects in respect of
corporate misconduct.
Canadian securities regulators have generally concluded
that Canadian laws, if effectively enforced, adequately protect
investors from selective disclosure. 08 In July 2002, Canadian
securities regulators issued a new policy of best practices in
disclosure, including that "companies must have written
disclosure policies, [and] a senior officer or committee must
police this policy;" and that there are specified "financial,
operational and structural data that companies must release in a
fair and careful manner."10 9  "Material" information is now
defined to include data on changes to accounting policies,
changes in rating agency decisions, and any exceptions to
corporate ethics or conduct practices that are put in place for key
employees. They have also proposed new standards that would
require disclosure of off-balance risks such as risks created by
contractual obligations that would affect future cash flow of the
enterprise. These are in addition to existing disclosure
requirements. Blackout periods are to be used to prevent
insiders from trading around key reporting periods. The policy
suggests that the board or audit committee should review any
disclosure regarding earnings guidance or any news releases
containing new financial data. All information filed on the
SEDAR website should also be immediately posted on the
corporation's website; and any investor should be able to listen to
analyst conference calls. This new policy of best practices also
108 See Douglas M. Hyndman, Canadian Securities Regulation: Challenges and
Choices, Address to the Canadian Investor Relations Institute (Sept. 12, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.bcs.bc.ca/bcproposals/bulletin-0919.asp).
109 Richard Blackwell, Securities Regulators Have New Disclosure Policy,
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, July 16, 2002. at B15; see also The Accounting Standards
Board of Canada, November Decision Summary, at www.acsbcanada.org (November
11, 2002).
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suggests that companies should be cautious in circulating
analysts' reports to shareholders because this could be construed
as endorsement of the report. "Companies are not prohibited
from speaking to the media about non-material information or
previously disclosed material information. " 110  These best
practices will increase transparency; however, it is evident that
their implementation will be resisted. For example, the TSX
Venture Exchange has responded to this policy by expressing
concern that more timely disclosure to shareholders may not be
worth the added expense and has urged its listed companies to
object to some parts of the policy.'1 ' Perhaps this indicates that
even with all the post-Enron regulatory changes south of the
border, enhanced protection of shareholder interests is resisted
by some Canadian corporate interests.
In October 2002, the Ontario government introduced
proposed changes to the Ontario Securities Act that will provide
for civil liability in secondary market disclosure violations;
create express prohibitions against securities fraud, market
manipulation and misleading statements; grant new rule
making authority in respect of audit committee standards and
internal accountability controls; and strengthen the enforcement
powers of the Ontario Securities Commission. 112 Moreover,
discussions regarding whether there should be one national
securities regulatory system instead of the existing thirteen have
received new vigor in light of Enron.113
These initiatives are running parallel to "deregulation"
initiatives, such as those proposed by the British Columbia
Securities Commission. The Securities Commission's
"deregulation project" is aimed at "streamlining the securities
system," and replacing the current prospectus based system with
a regime of periodic continuous disclosure of all material
information." 4 The British Columbia proposal would change the
110 Id.
11 See TSX VENTURE EXCH., COMMENTS ON CSA CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE
PROPOSALS (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://www.tse.comien/mediaNews/
newsreleases/news3084.html.
112 Brown, supra note 107; Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act,
Ontario Legislative Assembly 198 available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/
Regulation/ontario-securities.html (November 12, 2002).
113 FIVE YEAR REVIEW COMM. OF ONTARIO SECURITIES LAWS, DRAFT REPORT at
www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Summary/srac_.5yr-mr-20020529.htm (May 29, 2002).
114 See BRITISH COLUMBIA SEC. COMM'N, NEW PROPOSALS FOR SECURITIES
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definition of materiality to make it more expansive, requiring the
reporting of all "material information" relating to the business
and affairs of an issuer that would be reasonably expected to
result in a significant change in the market price or the value of
the securities. The "continuous disclosure" element of this project
is critically important, and definitions of:materiality and quality
of disclosure are essential to investor confidence. Moreover, the
detailed code of conduct will be replaced with a "principles-based
code of conduct. 11 5 The deregulation project also proposes new
investor remedies in terms of actions against issuers, their
directors and officers, and in some cases underwriters, for
misrepresentations or failure to disclose material information on
a timely basis. It includes increased enforcement powers for the
commission. Again, this is potentially very positive or negative,
depending on how the code is to be administrated, what the
financial statement requirements will be, the quality of
disclosure standards to protect investors ,and who in the system
provides the accountability check through enforcement of
standards. Measures are only as good as effective enforcement,
and the British Columbia government's current downsizing and
service shedding does not bode well for these changes in terms of
whether the new standards will be rigorously enforced.
Moreover, it is unclear whether small investors will be able to
access these remedies.
U.S. stock exchanges have announced new listing standards
to restore investor confidence, including, ensuring the
independence of directors and strengthening corporate
governance practice. 116  The NYSE's . new Corporate
Accountability and Listing Standards .also make important
improvements in requiring audit committees to be comprised
solely of independent directors; outside director in-camera
meetings; enhanced internal audit . functions; improved
definitions of independence (no material relationship with the
listed company); a code of business conduct and ethics; and CEO
REGULATION, available at http://www.bcs.bc.ca/bcproposals/default.asp.
115 Id. at 2.
116 See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Approves Measures to
Strengthen Corporate Accountability (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/NT00545421.html [hereinafter NYSE]; Bureau of Nat'l
Affairs, NASDAQ Approves Changes to Rules for Governance of Listed Companies
(June. 3, 2002), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/cgr.nsf/is/aOa5p7d3f4
[hereinafter NASDAQ].
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annual certification that he or she is not aware of any violation
of NYSE corporate governance standards. 117 These standards
will go a long measure towards investor protection, although
their successful implementation requires some monitoring.
NASDAQ will require tightening the definition of "independent
director," require that related party transactions be approved by
the audit committee or comparable body, and its new rules
clarify that a company can be de-listed for misrepresenting
information. 118 In some cases, however, this is tinkering with
rules on independence, as illustrated by the new NASDAQ
standards set in respect of charitable donations." 9 It is difficult
to see how a director is independent if a $200,000 donation can
still be made to an organization of which the director is an
executive officer.
In Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), which
accounts for ninety percent of trading in Canada, continues to
promulgate only voluntary guidelines, notwithstanding the fact
that its own commissioned studies indicate that the majority of
listed corporations do not meet the guidelines. 20 While the
commitment to flexibility in governance structures is laudable,
the failure to set some minimum governance standards is
regrettable. The TSX has issued new proposed disclosure
requirements and amended voluntary guidelines on corporate
governance. 121 The guidelines include enhanced disclosure on
the number of unrelated directors on the corporate board.
Furthermore, they suggest that audit committees should be
composed only of unrelated directors; that the audit committee
should draft a charter that sets out the audit committee's roles
and responsibilities; and that all members of the audit
committee should be financially literate, with at least one
117 See NYSE, supra note 116.
118 See NASDAQ, supra note 116 . For example, current limits on director
compensation of $60,000 will extend to receipt of such payments by a family
member of the director.
119 Contributions to charities where the director is an executive officer will be
limited to the greater of $200,000 or five percent of the charity's gross revenues if
the director is still to be considered independent. Id.
120 See TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL $ 1400-306 (Oct. 7,
2002), available at http:/www.tse.com [hereinafter TSX COMPANY MANUAL].
121 See TSX, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY-
PROPOSED NEW DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND AMENDED GUIDELINES (Apr. 26,
2002), available at http://tsx.com/en/tradingservices/docs/2450Apr26-02-Request
_forComments.pdf.
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member having accounting or related financial expertise. The
guidelines stop short, however, of requiring the corporation to
disclose the nature of the relationship of related directors with
the corporation, critical to shareholder assessment of the ability
of the directors to effectively oversee the activities of corporate
officers. It fails to recommend that corporations disclose the
results of shareholder votes. It does not create any guidelines for
director remuneration, and it does not require compensation
committees to be made exclusively of unrelated directors. The
proposed guidelines also do not suggest that auditor's fees be
reported broken down on the basis of services performed. Many
of these governance changes are suggestions that have been
highlighted in the public discourse post-Enron, and yet the
Canadian version of rose-colored glasses is that these should not
be mandatory features of the system.
The TSX has decided that it will not require listing
companies to have an independent board chair, lead director, or
board leader as a condition of filing, even though its own Joint
Corporate Governance Project recommended this last year as an
important feature of effective governance. 122 The only actual
requirement is that corporations report their governance
practices, something that most have neglected to do so in the
past.123 The TSX reports that its mandate in respect of corporate
governance is to require disclosure of corporate governance
systems rather than legislate corporate governance standards. 124
Moreover, the corporate governance guidelines continue to be
exclusively shareholder focused, as discussed above. The
guidelines are silent on the need for, or benefits of, board
diversity based on gender, race, or stakeholder interest.
D. Accounting Standards
While a full discussion of accounting standards is well
beyond the scope of this Article, accounting is integrally linked to
good governance. Canadian accounting standards differed from
those in the United States for a number of years. Historically,
the Accounting Standards Board ("AcSB") emphasized the
identification of sound principles in setting accounting
122 See BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 50.
123 See TSX COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 120, 1400-772, -773.
124 See id. 1 1400-773.
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standards. This "principles-based" approach emphasized for
many years the need for officers preparing financial statements
to comply with the spirit and overall objective of financial
reporting standards, exercising professional judgment based on
those principles to reach sound conclusions as to the appropriate
accounting for specific transactions. Yet as pressure for
convergence of accounting standards within North America
grew, Canada moved towards the rule-oriented approach of U.S.
standards, with regulators issuing increasingly detailed
interpretations of the application of particular standards. In
turn, this has created the same sort of incentives to engage in
financial reporting that utilizes loopholes in interpretation
statements to avoid the reporting of particular events or
transactions. Post-Enron, one issue is whether there will be
some pressure to rethink this approach.
There is also reluctance to act in advance of the United
States. For example, the AcSB is currently considering whether
Canadian companies should be required to cost stock options in
their financial statements, the concern being whether Canada
would be competitively disadvantaged if this was mandated
ahead of the United States.125 Given corporate pressure, U.S.
legislators backed down on requiring companies to report stock
options as expenses, notwithstanding the fact that there are
likely to be international standards that would require
companies to treat stock options as expenses. While widely
acknowledged that the market would benefit from such
disclosure and that accounting standards would be of a better
quality, accounting bodies have expressed concern about the
"hit" that Canadian corporations would take in their income
statements. 26 The issue is an illustration of how closely both
our markets and our public policymaking are tied to the United
States. Institutional investors in both Canada and the United
States, such as the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan and TIAA-
CREF have launched campaigns to pressure corporations to
treat stock options as expenses in order to create transparency
and accountability in how these options affect the bottom line of
125 See CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS FORUM, STOCK-
BASED COMPENSATION AND OTHER STOCK BASED PAYMENTS (Aug. 14, 2002),
available at http://www.cica.ca/index.cfm/ci~id/1203/la_id/1.htm. [hereinafter
CANADIAN INSTITUTE]
126 Id.
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the corporation's financial statement. 27
The objective of audited financial statements is to advise
investors of the financial position of an issuing company, thus
the statements should be aimed at fairly representing that
position. There may also need to be enhanced accountability of
corporate officers in ensuring that representation is accurate. As
a direct outcome of Enron, the AcSB has issued new guidelines,
aimed at enhancing transparency. 28  The guidelines on
consolidation of SPEs and disclosure of guarantees are in the
process of receiving public comment. The proposed Canadian
guideline on "Consolidation of Special-Purpose Entities" is aimed
at improving financial reporting of enterprises involved with
SPEs, not to restrict the use of SPEs, on the premise that SPEs
serve a valid business purpose of isolating assets or activities to
protect the interests of investors or creditors, and/or to reallocate
risks. 129  However, there needs to be transparency in the
reporting relationship. The guideline would require that the
assets, liabilities and result of the SPE's activities be
consolidated in the corporation's balance sheet if it is a primary
127 See ONTARIO TEACHERS' PENSION PLAN, A BETTER OPTION, available at
http://www.otpp.com/web/website.nsf/web/BetterOption; see also Joann S. Lubin,
TIAA-CREF Wants Options Seen As Expenses, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at A3.
128 The Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) is a professionally regulated body
by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). See Chartered
Accountants of Canada, http://www.acsbcanada.org. Since 2000, the AcSB and the
U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have been engaged in a
program to harmonize Canadian accounting standards with those in the United
States. For the FASB's interpretation of ARB No. 51, see FASB, CONSOLIDATION OF
CERTAIN SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES (Exposure Draft-Proposed Interpretation,
June 28, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org [hereinafter FASB PROPOSED
INTERPRETATION]. The AcSB consists of "persons knowledgeable in the preparation
and use of financial statements that are drawn from public practice, business and
academe." ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., CASH FLOW AND OTHER PER SHARE
INFORMATION (Proposed Accounting Recommendation, Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.cica.ca/multimedia/download.jibrary/standards/documentsfor commen
t/English/escashflow.pdf.
129 See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., CONSOLIDATION OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE
ENTITIES, at i (Draft Guideline), available at http://www.acsbcanada.org.
[hereinafter ACSB GUIDELINE]. As with the United States, the current practice in
Canada is that SPEs are off-balance sheet and that even where there is a nominal
owner, the activities of the SPE are not consolidated for income reporting purposes.
See id; Press Release, Canadian Inst. of Chartered Accountants, Accounting
Standards Board Issues New Guidelines to Improve Disclosure, Help Prevent
Enron-Type Situation from Occurring in Canada (Aug. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.cica.ca/index.cfin/la_id/l/ciid/7794.htm [hereinafter Canadian
Institute].
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beneficiary that controls the SPE by means of variable
interests. 30 The guideline will become effective for interim fiscal
periods commencing on or after April 2003 for SPEs previously
created, and for all SPEs created once the guideline is issued. 131
While the guideline is aimed at harmonizing with the U.S.
draft regulation, there are some specified differences. For
example, the proposed Canadian guideline requires a judgment
about whether an equity investment in an SPE is sufficient to
finance the SPE's operations without relying on support from
variable interest holders. In contrast, the U.S. standard creates
an "investment of 10% of total assets" test, specifically that an
equity investment of less than ten percent of the SPE's total
assets is presumed to be insufficient to allow the SPE to finance
its activities without relying on financial support from variable
interest holders. 132 The Canadian AcSB concluded that this
threshold is inconsistent with the underlying requirement that
the amount of equity investment be greater than or equal to
expected future losses and likely would result in a conclusion
that the equity investment in an SPE is sufficient to finance the
SPE's operations unassisted, in circumstances where this
conclusion would be unwarranted. 133 It was concerned that it
would set an arbitrary threshold that would then become a rule
in practice. 34 Such specific differences are identified in the
guideline, and are ostensibly aimed at greater transparency. 135
130 See AcSB GUIDELINE, supra note 129, at i. Variable interests arise from
certain contractual rights and obligations or ownership interests, and are the means
by which an enterprise provides financial support for the SPE and by which it gains
or loses from activities that affects the SPE's assets and liabilities. See id. Control is
defined as holding a majority of the variable interests in an SPE or holding variable
interests that are both significant in terms of the total variable interests and
significantly larger that any other party's interest. See id.
131 See id. at ii. For annual and interim fiscal periods before the guideline
becomes effective, an enterprise that is the primary beneficiary of an SPE or has a
significant ownership interest should disclose general information regarding its
relationship with the SPE, the nature and purpose of the SPE, and the expected
effects on future periods' financial statement of consolidating SPEs, if known. See
id.
132 See FASB PROPOSED INTERPRETATION, supra note 128, 9(b). The
presumption is overcome if there is persuasive evidence that an equity investment
of less than ten percent is comparable to the equity in businesses that engage in
similar transactions with similar risks and that are not SPEs. See id.
133 See ACSB GUIDELINE, supra note 129, at iii.
134 See id. ("AcSB members could see no justification for establishing an
arbitrary threshold that would become the rule in practice.").
135 See id. (listing significant differences between the Canadian and U.S.
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For example, where an enterprise with a variable interest in an
SPE has not determined whether it is a primary beneficiary, the
guidelines suggest that it should disclose that as well, including
its relationship with and the nature and purpose of the SPE.
Where it is the primary beneficiary, it should disclose the
expected effects on future periods' financial statements of
consolidating the SPE's assets, liabilities, and operating results,
including the fair value of the SPE's assets, liabilities, and non-
controlling interests at the end of its most recently completed
fiscal period. Additionally, the SPE should disclose its revenues,
expenses and net income for that period and any consolidating
adjustments. 136 These guidelines respond directly to Enron's
misuse of SPEs.
The AcSB has also issued a new "Disclosure of Guarantees"
guideline that will "require [corporate] entities to disclose key
information about types of guarantees that require payment
contingent on specified future events, . .. [and require that
disclosures regarding] guarantees be provided in interim
statements where a change has occurred since the most recently
completed fiscal year."137  Both these new guidelines are a
response to U.S. standards that the AcSB views as playing a key
role in Enron's failure. 38 They are aimed at ensuring greater
transparency and more accurate information for investors,
analysts, and regulators about both risk and financial position of
the corporation. They have also been harmonized with the U.S.
standards.
These developments are important, although they also
highlight a more systemic underlying issue-the malleability of
accounting standards in general. The AcSB is also involved in
discussions with the International Accounting Standards Board,
which was recently established to promote harmonization of
proposals).
136 See id. at 8. "Information is disclosed to the extent that it is available to the
enterprise, [and] ... when fair values.., are unavailable, their carrying amounts
are disclosed instead." Id.
137 CANADIAN INSTITUTE, supra note 125; ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
DISCLOSURE OF GUARANTEES, (Draft Guideline), available at
http://www.acsbcanada.org (effective for fiscal periods ending after December 31,
2002).
138 See CANADIAN INSTITUTE, supra note 125 (quoting Paul Cherry, Chairman,
Accounting Standards Board, concerning the research that "identified two
standards that played a role in the demise of Enron").
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
accounting standards and provide reliable financial reporting to
enhance investor confidence in global capital markets. It may
also facilitate the exchange of lessons in respect of the rigor of
accounting standards, and perhaps ultimately reduce those
aspects of the malleability that work to the detriment of diverse
investors who rely on the financial reporting in their investment
decisions.
The International Organization of Securities Commissions,
representing 16 securities regulators from developed markets,
has formed a sub-committee comprised of senior representatives
of member regulators to provide international co-ordination and
response to the issues raised by the Enron collapse and other
recent corporate failures. The sub-committee will examine how
different jurisdictions address these issues, share the results of
investigations, and make recommendations for reform. Once
again, however, there appears to be a missed opportunity in
rethinking securities protection. The operating paradigm is
protection of equity investors. This is an important project, but
should not be the only objective. For example, in addition to
transparency requirements as a means of reducing managerial
self-dealing, regulatory intervention could require reporting on
human rights violations, environmental liability, and reporting
on the social and economic cost/benefits of particular
transactions. Increased requirements to discuss the risks of
particular decisions to equity investors could be accompanied by
disclosure of these social and economic risks. If investors are
truly to make informed decisions in respect of their diversified
portfolios, then they should be provided with these disclosures.
As noted above, a recent Canadian survey found that seventy-
two percent of those surveyed wanted corporate executives to
take social responsibility into account in corporate decision-
making, indicating a growing awareness of corporate decision-
making on social and economic activity.13 9 This awareness needs
translation into a corporate law paradigm that takes account of
the collective interests of broader stakeholders and long-term
139 See VECTOR RESEARCH, ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION POLL
CONDUCTED FOR THE CANADIAN DEMOCRACY AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
COMMISSION (2001), available at http://www.corporate-
accountability/ca/pdfs/PollReport.pdf (noting that in a national sample of 2,006
individuals, seventy-two percent said "business should pursue social
responsibilities, not just profits").
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generation of economic activity, not merely short-term
shareholder return.
Finally, this discussion exposes a more fundamental
problem of our current capital markets. Corporations are
dependent on the availability of cost-effective capital; in North
America much of that capital is derived from securities markets
and secondary trading. This dependence creates enormous
power by large investors to influence corporate activity in their
own interests, Absent externally imposed standards as to how
capital is used and how costs are accounted for, corporations will
necessarily conduct their activities with a careful eye on market
reaction. While facilitating the expression of investor
preferences should strengthen corporate, accountability,
investors represent only a fraction of society, the fraction that
has surplus property to invest. Capital markets cannot and
should not replace public law standards and enforcement. What
is required is a conception of the corporation that integrates
public policy across a range of issues, instead of isolating the
securities regime as a "private law."
IV. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
In Canada, shareholder rights and remedies are codified in
both corporate law and securities laws, and are governed by a
mixed federal and provincial legislative scheme, creating some
inconsistencies across systems.
Shareholder activism in Canada has been confined largely to
"exit" as opposed to "voice," in part, the result of corporate laws
that until recently limited the scope of shareholder activism.
Amendments to the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA)
in 2001 included a number of provisions relating to corporate
governance and enhancing shareholder involvement in corporate
decision-making. 140  The principal changes are directed at
shareholder participation, including enhanced access to
disclosures; removal of former prohibitions on shareholder
140 See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44 (1985) (Can.);
Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 2001 S.O.R. 01-2139; see also Industry
Canada, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/cs01381e.html (indicating that the Canada Business
Corporations Act was significantly amended to improve the legal framework for
federal corporations by enhancing shareholder input and providing corporations
with greater flexibility).
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communications; use of new technologies in communication; the
ability of corporations to hold electronic meetings; and revised
proxy rules aimed at facilitating shareholder communication and
participation. There are also new shareholder remedies such as
liberalized proposal rules; ability to commence a civil action for
insider trading; new protection for minority shareholders on a
squeeze-out; and provisions governing unanimous shareholder
agreements.
Shareholder proposal provisions are generally aimed at
enhancing accountability of corporate officers and allowing
shareholders an increased opportunity to participate in
governance decisions. The new shareholder provisions in the
CBCA have elements that may both enhance and detract from
this objective. There are new holdings requirements before a
shareholder can bring forward a proposal. A shareholder must
alone or in combination hold one percent of the total number of
outstanding voting shares or $2,000 in market value of shares
for at least six months, before the shareholder is entitled to
submit a shareholder proposal. 141  While shareholders can
combine their shares to accomplish this, it is unclear why the
threshold was necessary when there was no evidence of any
abuses when there was no threshold. It appears to
unnecessarily exclude small investors. The wording limit of a
shareholder proposal was increased to 500 words that
management must include in its proxy circular, affording
shareholders slightly better opportunity to explain the rationale
underlying their proposal. 42  A proposal may include
nominations for the election of directors if the proposal is signed
by shareholders with five percent of holdings, but this does not
preclude nominations being made at a shareholder meeting.143
The reforms are likely to increase the scope and content of
shareholder proposals. Until late 2001, under the CBCA,
corporate officers could refuse to circulate a shareholder proposal
on the ground that "it clearly appears that the proposal is
submitted ... primarily for the purpose of promoting general
141 See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 137(1.1) (2001)
(Can.).
142 See id. § 48. However, new word limits on the proposal itself means there is
some question as to whether this is a gain.
143 See id. §§ 46, 52, 53.
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economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes." 144
This provision had the effect of halting efforts by shareholders to
use the proposal process to inject corporate accountability and
corporate responsibility into decision-making. Cases such as Re
Varity Corp. and Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada145 upheld
directors' exclusion of proposals on the basis that they were
primarily for political purposes, in that case aimed at
eliminating apartheid. The new language allows corporate
officers to refuse to circulate a proposal where it "clearly appears
that the proposal does not relate in a significant way to the
business or affairs of the corporation. " 146 This language is on its
face more expansive and could eliminate a key barrier to
shareholder proposals. It is based on the language of U.S.
statutes, however, and in the United States there has been an
uneven history in the SEC's and the court's deference to
exclusion of proposals because they "arise out of the ordinary
course of business."147
Lynne Dallas has observed that shareholder voting can
allow a wider expression of preferences, a means of enhancing
social responsibility, and ultimately greater accountability of
managers. 148 The recent changes to the CBCA also increase the
ability of shareholders to communicate with one another,
although the statute imposes an arbitrary limit of fifteen
shareholders allowed to communicate before dissident proxy
circular requirements are activated. 149 Shareholders can now
publicly communicate their intention to vote a particular way in
public speeches, press releases, websites, and other broadcast
media, without activating the solicitation prohibitions. 150 Given
the recent enactment of these measures, it is too early to gage
the potential for shareholder activism. Unlike the United
States, Canada has not had a strong history of shareholder
activism. This is likely to change. Recently, the Shareholder
Association for Research and Education worked with
144 See id. § 137(5) prior to the most recent amendments.
145 [1987] 60 O.R.2d 640 (stating that the "issue of apartheid in South Africa
[has a] nefarious effect on investment").
146 See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 137(5)(b.1) (1985)
(Can.).
147 See Wade, supra note 72.
148 See Dallas, supra note 58.
149 See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 150 (1985) (Can.).
150 See id. §§ 68, 147.
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institutional shareholders such as the R~gime compl6mataire de
retraite du syndicat des pompiers de Quebec on a shareholder
proposal asking Hudson's Bay to improve its code of conduct in
respect of sweatshop abuses in its supply chain. 51 The proposal
asked the company to purchase contracts to meet the ILO's
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and
to establish an independent monitoring process to evaluate
compliance. The proposal cast the issue as requiring stronger
policies and greater transparency about compliance, which
would in turn reduce risks to shareholders. These risks include
threat of lawsuits from affected workers, damage to the
company's reputation, and potential for consumer backlash. The
proposal garnered thirty-six percent of shareholder support, and
while it did not receive a majority, it sent a strong signal to
corporate officers, as well as drawing considerable public
attention to the corporation's current practices.
The Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan (OTPP), representing
over 300,000 current, former, and retired teachers, has enhanced
the transparency of its voting record by posting its proxy voting
record and its rationale for positions taken on specific proposals
on its website. OTPP has focused on relationship investing,
aimed at maximization of long-term shareholder value through
best governance practices, dialogue with corporate officials,
voting all proxy votes that it is eligible to vote, and where
necessary, sponsoring resolutions. OTPP is also lobbying for
regulatory change to require corporations to comply with
corporate governance standards. It advocates requiring
corporations to "publicly disclose the details of all votes taken at
annual or special meetings of shareholders."152 OTPP also
promotes pension law change to emphasize the duty of
investment managers to vote their proxies and to disclose to
beneficiaries how they voted; currently only sixty percent of
15, See S'HOLDER ASS'N FOR RESEARCH AND EDUC., RECORD NUMBERS SUPPORT
SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTION AT THE BAY ON SWEATSHOPS (May 23, 2002), available
at http://www.share.ca/researclisocial-resp-investormain.htm (describing
overwhelming support for a resolution calling for an end to alleged sweatshop
abuses).
152 Letter from Brian J. Gibson, Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board, to Hon.
Leo Kolber, Chairman, The Standing Senate Comm. on Banking, Trade and
Commerce (May 26, 2002) (available at http://www.otpp.com/web/website.
nsf/web/home).
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these shares are regularly voted. 5 3
Recently, institutional shareholders representing $500
billion in assets ($350 billion invested in Canadian publicly
traded corporations) formed the Canadian Coalition for Good
Governance. 154 The group includes pension funds, mutual funds,
and money managers, and its express goal is to align the
interests of managers with those of shareholders. Such a
coalition is likely to enhance corporate governance practice,
particularly if the coalition utilizes its proxy voting power to
influence change.
However, the alignment of shareholder and managerial
interest does not always mean that the interests of other
stakeholders will be protected. It is premature to speculate on
these issues. A key question will be how these investors
approach the interests of stakeholders and the question of
balancing those interests with their own beneficiaries. In many
cases, these interests align. The timeline that these
shareholders focus on is also important, because short-term
return, as opposed to long-term investment tends to push
corporate managers into making decisions that harm workers
and create short-term earnings in order to keep investors
satisfied. In this respect, there may be a qualitative difference
between pension funds, which are trustees for pensioners and
workers, and other institutional investors whose objective is
short-term return. Scholars such as Susan Stabile and Ron
Davis have suggested that pension funds may offer a means of
greater corporate democracy because of the economic power they
wield, depending on how they view their fiduciary and trust
obligations. 155
V. AUDITORS AS GATEKEEPERS
There is a pressing issue of the role of external auditor that
has yet to be resolved in the Canadian system. Enron's external
153 See id.
154 See ONT. TEACHERS' PENSION PLAN, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS FORM
COALITION TO FIGHT FOR IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 27, 2002),
available at http://www.otpp.com/web/website.nsf/web/coalitionforcorpgov.
155 See Enron Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Susan J. Stabile, Professor, Saint John's University
School of Law), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov.affairs/020502stabile.htm;
Ronald B. Davis, Enron and Two Aspects of the Pension Puzzle (Sept. 2002) (on file
with author).
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auditor earned $27 million in consulting fees and $25 million in
audit fees from Enron in 2000, and the Senate Committee Report
concluded that this amount of earnings seriously compromised
the independence of the auditor. 156 Current practices create
incentives for auditors to compromise the reliability of financial
statements in order to retain lucrative consulting contracts and
to preserve close working relationships with corporate managers.
Enron and other recent failures of public traded companies have
necessitated corporate boards examining their relationship to
the corporate auditing firm. There is a serious question of
whether external auditors can make an objective assessment of
the company's financial statements when the auditor's
accounting firm is dependent on the lucrative fees from provision
of other services to the corporation. 15 7 Yet lucrative consulting
fees are a major source of revenue for accounting firms, and it is
unclear that they will move internationally to divest these
activities. A key part of Anglo-American corporate board
structure is the audit committee and its relationship to the
external auditor. The auditor is responsible for providing an
independent assessment of the firm's financial and economic
status. Absent an effective and independent external audit
process, directors, investors, and creditors are unable to make
informed choices. If the external auditing firm is too close to the
corporation's officers, there is both financial and normative
pressure to report the financial affairs of the corporation in such
a way as to present the most positive picture to the investing
public.
Canadian firms suffer from the same conflicts in terms of
provision of consulting services and the concurrent provision of
audit services. Aside from whether objectivity in auditing is
possible in such instances, it is evident post-Enron that there is
a serious loss of investor confidence in financial disclosures when
these relationships exist. The issue of public confidence is also
important to any shift in accounting standards away from
prescriptive rules and greater dependence on broader principles
156 See S. REP. No. 107-70, at 58 (2002).
157 See The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the
Gatekeepers Remain Silent?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor,
Columbia University Law School) (offering an insightful analysis of the role of
Enron's external auditor).
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and the professional judgment of auditors. New standards
issued by the Assurance Standards Board of the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants require that the auditor
address with the Audit Committee both the quality and the
acceptability of the accounting policies adopted by a company.
The auditor should also disclose potential conflict of interest or
other involvement in corporate activity that may impact on the
ability to give an objective assessment of the financial status of
the corporation, including reporting on all non-audit services
provided to the company and related fees. Directors have an
obligation to satisfy themselves that non-audit services do not
impair the auditor's objectivity or integrity of the financial
reporting.
While it makes some sense for a professional body to
regulate itself, governance of those professional bodies also
requires some independent oversight. In July 2002, the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants announced a new
independent public oversight for auditors of public companies
("the Accountability Board").158 The new Accountability Board is
aimed at restoring investor confidence and protecting the public
interest.159 Unlike the Public Accountability Board that has
been legislated in the United States to reform oversight and
improve accountability of auditors of public companies, 160 this is
a move by the industry to pre-empt legislation. It is not yet clear
what its mandate will be and how it will fulfill its accountability
obligations.
There are also proposed new standards on independence of
auditors, draft guidelines on management discussion and
analysis of reports, greater inspection of auditors, and a new
Auditing and Assurance Standards Council. Further study of
these initiatives will be necessary to determine whether or not
they adequately respond to the problems identified in the
current auditing regime.
158 See Press Release, David Smith, Statement on New Independent Public
Oversight for Auditors of Public Companies (July 17, 2002) (available at
http'//www.cica.ca/cica/cicawebsite.nsf/public/Sp-Smith4) (noting that the chartered
accountant profession has a role to play in reforming the financial system in
numerous areas).
159 See id.
160 See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission
Formally Proposes a Framework of a Public Accountability Board (June 20, 2002),
available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2002-91.htm.
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There is also likely to be a shift in the manner in which
securities analysts will be regulated in Canada. In August 2002,
CIBC World Markets Inc. became the first Canadian-based
brokerage firm to revamp its stock rating system since U.S.
dealers were implicated in the Enron and other corporate
crises.161  A Securities Industry Committee on Analyst
Standards, chaired by Purdy Crawford, reported in 2001 and
made thirty-three recommendations to deal with conflicts of
interest and failure to disclose ties between securities analysts
and the firms on which they were reporting. 162  The
recommendations call for mandatory disclose of conflicts of
interest for the broker and analysts, prohibition of certain
relationships for analysts producing research, recommending
best practices for the issuance of securities analysts reports, and
a number of recommendations that focus on good governance. If
implemented, these would go some measure to reduce many of
the serious problems that currently exist with analysts as one of
the "gatekeepers" of the integrity of the securities regime.
CONCLUSION
The most disappointing aspect of the debates arising out of
Enron is that it has not been viewed as an occasion for more
fundamental thinking about the role of corporate governance
and participation in capital markets. Economic activity that
results in the generation of goods and services is essential to
economic growth and enhancing social welfare. The financial
markets do allow access to affordable capital, however, according
to one economist, only three cents of every dollar traded on the
TSX since 2000 have gone towards actually raising new money
for investments. 163 The gap between the capital required for
productive activity and the speculative nature of capital markets
is increasing. This poses new challenges for how we
conceptualize the corporation and its ability to attract capital for
future productive activity.
161 See Richard Blackwell, Move Follows Action at U.S. Firms, TORONTO GLOBE
& MAIL, Aug. 26, 2002, at B1.
162 See SECURITIES INDUSTRY COMMITTEE ON ANALYST STANDARDS (SICAS),
FINAL REPORT (Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with author).
163 See Jim Stanford, The End of the Market?, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June
27, 2002, at B1.
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Enron and the subsequent revelations at other large U.S.
publicly traded corporations have challenged the widely accepted
belief that our system of regulation, disclosure, and market
adjustment adequately protects investors, employees and
pensioners. The current governance structure of Canadian
corporations is vulnerable to some of the same confluence of
factors that resulted in a failure of governance at Enron. In
Canada, there may be additional factors as a result of our
publicly traded corporations being largely closely held, including:
increased risk of managerial and majority shareholder collusion
and opportunism to the detriment of the interests of smaller
investors; social norms that militate against increasing board
diversity; a failure to require a high level of financial literacy of
corporate directors; and failure to cost all the effects of particular
corporate conduct. The current Canadian securities regime,
modeled after the U.S. regime, is an enabling regime that is
aimed at allowing corporations to raise capital in a cost-effective
manner while ensuring a high level of disclosure so that
investors can make informed choices about risk/return on their
investments. Yet it is still unclear that corporate boards and
their auditors as gatekeepers ensure that corporate transactions
are sufficiently transparent such that investors can make
informed choices.
Only costs internal to the corporation are measured in
determinants of corporate success, primarily through the
measure of return to shareholders. It completely bypasses the
debate regarding why property in this context is a higher valued
commodity than human capital or other investments. It misses
an important opportunity to more fully consider the integration
of corporate, securities, and other public law regimes in terms of
the normative underpinnings and public policy goals of corporate
activity. It bypasses any discussion as to whether social welfare
maximization, the core objective of classical economics, needs to
be recast to look at a more equitable distribution of wealth in
order to redress historical inequities. It also bypasses any
discussion regarding the maleness of corporate behaviour and
the caring and collective approaches that women can offer.
These are deeply embedded normative notions that have
distributional consequences without ever being explicitly
acknowledged. While enterprise wealth maximization may be
the appropriate interim model for the corporation, it must be
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accompanied by a greatly strengthened public law framework in
securities law, labour law, human rights protection, consumer
protection, and environmental law, and a range of other
enforceable standards that temper the wealth-seeking objectives
of the corporation.
